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Optimal mental health is not simply a function of experiencing 
more positive than negative affect, on average. Such a static 
view of emotional experience ignores the moment-to-moment 
ebb and flow of affect that can be influenced by various factors 
both internal (e.g., cognitive, biological) and external (e.g., 
events) to the person. Emotional experience is dynamic, not 
static, and methods that provide multiple microassessments of 
emotional experience across time and situations can shed light 
on the dynamic nature of various affective processes that are 
theorized to be central to the development and course of psy-
chopathology. In this review, we focus on three varieties of 
affective dynamics that have been used in investigations of psy-
chopathology: affective instability, inertia, and emotional dif-
ferentiation. Although other features of affective dynamics have 
been studied (e.g., variability; Wichers, Wigman, & Myin-
Germeys, 2015), we focus on these three because they truly cap-
ture moment-to-moment change and can be estimated based on 
repeated assessments of momentary affect.
Unfortunately, dynamic affective processes have historically 
been neglected in psychopathology research (Ebner-Priemer & 
Trull, 2011), and in behavioral science more generally (Molenaar 
& Campbell, 2009). This is not surprising because monitoring 
and analyzing dynamic processes can be challenging. However, 
both traditional assessment methods (e.g. retrospective question-
naires) and classical statistical indices (e.g., group means) are (a) 
not well suited for fully capturing within-person processes over 
time and (b) introduce biases into measurement. For example, 
retrospective questionnaires or interviews require respondents to 
speculate about their affective dynamics. Questions like “Do you 
often change from your usual mood to feeling irritable, very 
depressed, or very nervous?” require individuals to estimate 
baselines (what is typical), aggregate over time, and average 
over different emotions. It is perhaps not surprising that associa-
tions between prospectively monitored affective changes and 
retrospective ratings of these changes are usually weak (Links, 
Heisel, & Garland, 2003; Solhan, Trull, Jahng, & Wood, 2009).
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To investigate affective dynamics precisely, it is essential 
to use time-sensitive assessment and analyses. Ideally, investi-
gators will use technology (e.g., e-diaries, smartphones) that 
repeatedly assesses affect with accurate time-stamping. 
Assessment occasions may be either event-contingent, at ran-
dom intervals, or a combination of both (Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 
2013). Crucially, assessments should occur at a timescale that is 
appropriate to the affective processes of interest (Bolger, Davis, 
& Rafaeli, 2003; Hollenstein, 2015). Given that this may not 
always be known, sampling affect at the highest possible 
frequency (without overburdening participants) may be advisa-
ble (Bolger et al., 2003; Ebner-Priemer & Sawitzki, 2007). 
However, even an appropriate sampling protocol does not, in 
and of itself, guarantee a precise and accurate picture of affec-
tive dynamics. It is also necessary to use appropriate analytic 
techniques that fully capture the dynamic nature of affective 
processes.
Perhaps the most egregious example of using inappropriate 
summary indices to capture a dynamic process is the use of the 
standard deviation (or equivalently, a variance) as a proxy for 
affective instability. A standard deviation is not time-sensitive 
because it does not account for moment-to-moment changes in 
affect (Ebner-Priemer, Eid, Kleindienst, Stabenow, & Trull, 
2009; Ebner-Priemer et al., 2007). An often used example 
(Ebner-Priemer et al., 2009) may help to illustrate the problem: 
Imagine being on vacation at two different locations (A, B) for 
2 weeks each. Location A alternates between rain and sunshine 
every other day, whereas location B’s weather is more stable, 
with 1 week of pure sunshine and 1 week of continuous rain. 
Even though we would label the weather of Location B as more 
stable than in Location A, the standard deviation would be 
the same. Therefore, several authors argue for differentiating 
between variability and instability on a theoretical basis (Ebner-
Priemer et al., 2009; Ebner-Priemer et al., 2007; Jahng et al., 
2011; Koval, Pe, Meers, & Kuppens, 2013; Trull et al., 2008). 
Variability is the general dispersion of scores, whereas instability 
comprises two components: variability and temporal depend-
ency (Jahng et al., 2011; Koval et al., 2013; Trull et al., 2008). 
Instability can be measured using a single index that considers 
both variability and temporal dependency (e.g., the squared 
successive difference [SSD]; Jahng, Wood, & Trull, 2008) or by 
examining these two components separately. This idea of 
decomposing responses into their multiple sources of variance 
across repeated measurements, whether it be systematic ordering 
across time or across different affective subscales, is a critical 
point of overlap in the three indices that we review. Such an 
approach enables more precise and theoretically meaningful 




As mentioned, affective instability is most often conceptualized 
as the combination of variability and temporal dependency 
(Ebner-Priemer et al., 2007; Trull et al., 2008). Whereas 
variability (i.e., the within-person SD) reflects the overall ampli-
tude of affective changes (i.e., how much affect deviates around 
its mean level), temporal dependency (i.e., the within-person 
autocorrelation) reflects the moment-to-moment consistency of 
affect across adjacent measurements.
Measurement
Accordingly, only indices which consider variability and 
temporal dependency should be used for analyzing instability. 
Multilevel models of SSDs (squared successive differences) and 
PACs (probability of acute changes) have been proposed in this 
regard (Jahng et al., 2008), as well as aggregated point-by-point 
changes (Santangelo et al., 2014).
Associations with Psychopathology
Most research on affective instability and psychopathology 
focuses on borderline personality disorder (BPD). Although a 
number of other mood and anxiety disorders are conceptualized 
as disorders of distress or emotion dysregulation, BPD is the 
only disorder for which affective instability is a specific diag-
nostic criterion (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
2013). Studies of affective instability using e-diaries and time-
sensitive statistics have consistently found heightened affective 
instability in patients with BPD (Ebner-Priemer et al., 2007; 
Santangelo, Bohus, & Ebner-Priemer, 2012; Santangelo et al., 
2014; Trull et al., 2008). However, most psychological disor-
ders show some kind of altered affective experience, deficient 
emotion regulation, or dysfunctional behavior to regulate emo-
tions. Therefore, affective instability has also been investigated 
in diagnostic groups not directly characterized by affective 
instability as a criterion or major symptom. For instance, height-
ened instability has been reported in patients with anxiety disor-
ders (Pfaltz, Michael, Grossman, Margraf, & Wilhelm, 2010), 
bipolar disorder (Jones, Hare, & Evershed, 2005), bulimia ner-
vosa (Anestis et al., 2010; Selby et al., 2012; Vansteelandt, 
Probst, & Pieters, 2013), major depression (MDD; Thompson 
et al., 2012), and posttraumatic stress disorder (Kashdan, 
Uswatte, Steger, & Julian, 2006). Recently, Santangelo et al. 
(2014) investigated the specificity of affective instability among 
patients with BPD. Surprisingly, patients with posttraumatic 
stress disorder and patients with bulimia nervosa showed 
similarly heightened instability of affect (emotional valence and 
distress) as patients with BPD.
On a methodological level, Santangelo et al. (2014) argue 
that three main topics regarding affective instability are under-
studied and should be considered to more fully characterize 
instability and differentiate affective processes between dis-
orders. First, events and triggers of emotional episodes are 
rarely assessed. However, they are likely to differ between dis-
orders. Tempting food might trigger affective processes in 
patients with eating disorders, but not in patients with PTSD, 
whereas for traumatic memories the opposite pattern might be 
expected. Second, the appraisal of events and the metacogni-
tions of the associated affective processes have been largely 
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neglected in psychopathology research (but see Thompson 
et al., 2012). Third, it might be helpful to investigate subcom-
ponents of dynamic processes. Several theoretical models of 
affective dysregulation specify distinct subcomponents, like 
Linehan’s (1993) biosocial theory (including sensitivity to 
emotional stimuli, responses to emotional stimuli, and return to 
baseline). Sophisticated theoretical and statistical models have 
been developed, which make these subcomponents accessible 
to research (Kuppens, Oravecz, & Tuerlinckx, 2010). A consid-
eration of subcomponents might also be more powerful in 
differentiating various psychopathological disorders with 
altered affective dynamics, compared to more global indices of 
affective instability.
Although BPD and MDD patients both display heightened 
affective instability relative to controls, instability is more 
extreme in BPD than MDD (Trull et al., 2008). Regarding the 
first subcomponent, BPD patients show higher levels of varia-
bility than individuals with MDD (Trull et al., 2008), perhaps 
reflecting greater reactivity to external events. This may (partly) 
account for the greater affective instability associated with 
BPD. Yet, the other subcomponent of instability may also play a 
role. Whereas depression is characterized by heightened tempo-
ral dependency of affect (i.e., a high autocorrelation), this is 
not typical for BPD (Houben, van den Noortgate, & Kuppens, 
in press). Because temporal dependency is inversely related to 
instability (Jahng et al., 2008), greater temporal dependency 
may contribute to relatively lower levels of instability observed 
among MDD versus BPD patients. Therefore, it is important to 
distinguish between variability and temporal dependency 
because differences in affective instability may be driven pri-
marily by one of these subcomponents (Koval et al., 2013; 
Wang, Hamaker, & Bergeman, 2012).
Recommendations
Like Ebner-Priemer et al. (2009), we recommend before starting 
a study to clarify: (a) if the temporal order of symptoms or fea-
tures is relevant for the research question posed; (b) which data 
acquisition method is best suited to the research question (e.g., 
e-diaries or a laboratory approach); (c) what is an appropriate 
sampling frequency, taking into account that an accelerated pro-
cess in general needs a higher sampling frequency; and (d) what 
is the best statistical index to model the instability under inves-
tigation. Adding the level (mean) of the variable of interest as a 
covariate might be appropriate, as interactions between instabil-
ity and level have been observed (Ebner-Priemer et al., 2009). 
Only the assessment of within-subject regulatory processes will 
enable us to consider psychopathology in terms of dysregula-
tion and dysfunction of the fundamental aspects of behavior and 
affect, and ultimately enable us to investigate and compare 




Parallel to the research on affective instability, a number 
of studies have examined individual differences specifically 
focusing on the temporal dependency component of affective 
dynamics. Greater temporal dependency of affect over time 
reflects a tendency for affect to be highly predictable from 
moment-to-moment. Given that an important function of affect 
is to change in response to fluctuating environmental demands 
(Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010), greater temporal dependency of 
affect can be considered to reflect affective inflexibility or 
resistance to change (Hollenstein, 2015). Therefore, this feature 
of affective dynamics has been labeled emotional inertia (Cook 
et al., 1995; Kuppens, Allen, & Sheeber, 2010; Suls, Green, & 
Hillis, 1998).
Measurement
Emotional inertia can be estimated as the within-person auto-
correlation of affect assessed repeatedly over time. This involves 
calculating the correlation between affect at time t and affect at 
time t-1 for each individual and, in a second step, correlating 
these within-person autocorrelations with between-person 
measures of well-being or psychopathology (e.g., Koval et al., 
2013). However, it is more common to simultaneously model 
emotional inertia at the within-person level and estimate how it 
is associated with measures of well-being or psychopathology 
at the between-person level, using a multilevel autoregressive 
model. Here, the within-person autoregressive slope (i.e., affect 
at time t-1 predicting affect at time t) is estimated at Level 1 and 
allowed to vary randomly across individuals at Level 2, where 
individual differences in emotional inertia can be related to per-
son-level covariates (e.g., Kuppens, Oravecz et al., 2010; Suls 
et al., 1998). An additional consideration when studying inertia 
is that a person’s autoregressive slope may be influenced by 
time trends. These can be readily removed by including a pre-
dictor representing the linear effect of time at the within-person 
level of the model. Furthermore, as mentioned before, research-
ers should carefully consider the timescale at which affect is 
assessed when interpreting their findings, as emotional inertia 
may show different relationships with measures of well-being 
and psychopathology at various time-scales (Koval et al., 2013).
Associations With Psychopathology
A number of studies have linked heightened inertia, particularly 
of negative affect (NA), with indicators of increased vulnerabil-
ity to depression, such as neuroticism (Suls et al., 1998), low 
self-esteem (Kuppens, Allen, et al., 2010), trait rumination 
(Koval, Kuppens, Allen, & Sheeber, 2012), subclinical depres-
sive symptoms (Brose, Schmiedek, Koval, & Kuppens, 2015; 
Koval et al., 2013), and the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism 
(Kuppens, van Roekel, Verhagen, & Engels, 2015). A direct link 
between emotional inertia and future onset of MDD has also 
been demonstrated (Kuppens et al., 2012; van de Leemput et al., 
2014). In fact, Kuppens et al. (2012) found that heightened iner-
tia prospectively predicted the development of MDD among 
adolescents even after adjusting for several known depression 
risk factors, including mean levels of NA and gender. However, 
whether or not emotional inertia remains elevated among indi-
viduals currently in an MDD episode remains unclear (cf. 
Kuppens, Allen, et al., 2010 vs. Thompson et al., 2012). 
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Nevertheless, heightened temporal dependency or inertia of NA 
appears to represent an “early warning signal” of an imminent 
transition into MDD (van de Leemput et al., 2014). This illus-
trates the utility of properly capturing affective 
dynamics in terms of diagnosis and early intervention of mental 
disorders such as depression.
Recommendations
To advance our understanding of emotional inertia future stud-
ies should: (a) investigate whether higher levels of inertia are 
also evident in other forms of psychopathology that are consid-
ered to involve alterations in emotional intensity (e.g., antisocial 
personality disorder), frequency (e.g., autism spectrum disor-
der), or duration (e.g., specific phobias; Gross & Jazaieri, 2014); 
(b) examine individual/group differences in inertia in response 
to the same sequence of emotion-eliciting stimuli in the lab 
(Koval et al., 2013) in order to clarify whether inertia reflects 
altered responding versus differential exposure to events; (c) 
measure inertia of various emotional response components 
(feelings, behavior, physiology) in the same participants and 
examine their relations with psychopathology; and (d) assess 
the longer term consequences of emotional inertia, including 
the possibility that increases or decreases in emotional inertia 




Another form of affective dynamics is emotional differentiation 
(also referred to as emotional granularity; Barrett, 2004). 
Emotional differentiation refers to an individual’s ability to dis-
tinguish between different forms of affective experience (e.g., 
sadness, anger, fear; Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 
2001). In other words, it is the complexity of emotional experi-
ence, with more differentiated emotional experience suggesting 
a greater ability to make subtle distinctions among emotional 
states as they are experienced. This is in contrast to emotional 
clarity, which refers to an individual’s perceived ability to dif-
ferentiate between emotions (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; Salovey, 
Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). Emotional clarity 
invokes metaemotional knowledge of whether and how one 
makes distinctions among emotions (see Salovey et al., 1995), 
and it can be influenced by a variety of factors (Boden, 
Thompson, Dizen, Berenbaum, & Baker, 2013). In contrast, 
emotional differentiation is more narrowly defined and reflects 
the application of this knowledge while experiencing emotions. 
Interestingly, evidence suggests that emotional clarity and emo-
tional differentiation, studied in real life using EMA, are at best 
only weakly related (Boden et al., 2013).
Emotion differentiation is considered an essential component 
of the emotion regulation process for several reasons (Carpenter 
& Trull, 2013). First, reliably and accurately identifying one’s 
emotions is important because effective emotion regulation 
relies on selecting a strategy that is appropriate for the specific 
emotion one is currently experiencing (Barrett et al., 2001). 
Second, to the degree that one can reliably differentiate among 
emotions as they are experienced, it is less likely that emotional 
experience will be labeled globally (all bad/negative; all good/
positive). Such polarized experience maps onto a number of 
constructs related to psychopathology, including cognitive 
biases like all-or-none thinking, splitting, affective instability, 
poor social functioning, impulsive behaviors, and substance 
use, as we discuss next.
Measurement
Historically, emotional differentiation has been assessed indi-
rectly by measuring individuals’ concurrent experiences of sev-
eral emotions and statistically estimating the overlap between 
these different emotion ratings. This avoids the perceptual biases 
associated with global retrospective reports. A variety of meth-
ods have been employed to estimate the degree of emotional 
differentiation, including: (a) calculating the average bivariate 
correlation between a set of affective items across an individual’s 
series of repeated assessments (Barrett et al., 2001; Zaki, 
Coifman, Rafaeli, Berenson, & Downey, 2013); (b) calculating 
an intraclass correlation (ICC) of an item set across time 
(Kashdan, Ferssizidis, Collins, & Muraven, 2010; Pond et al., 
2012; Tugade, Fredrickson, & Barrett, 2004); and (c) calculating 
an ICC for each measurement occasion across different affect 
subscales (Lane & Trull, in press; Tomko et al., in press).
To date, almost all investigations, regardless of their method-
ology, have created aggregate (i.e., global) measures of dif- 
ferentiation and subsequently drawn inferences about more 
dynamic, in-the-moment experiences. In contrast, Tomko et al. 
(in press) were the first to provide a method for calculating dif-
ferentiation at the level of experience and utilize it to predict 
dynamic outcomes. This approach represents a significant 
advance in the study of emotional differentiation as it allows 
researchers to begin hypothesizing about and directly testing the 
various time courses in which these dynamic processes unfold. 
Furthermore, a measure of emotional differentiation at the level 
of momentary experience more closely operationalizes the pro-
cess as it was originally theorized (see Barrett et al., 2001), as 
opposed to treating it as a stable between-person characteristic 
or trait. This again diverges from the concept of emotional clar-
ity, which is typically thought of as a stable between-person 
individual difference that is intended to be measured cross- 
sectionally (Boden et al., 2013).
Associations With Psychopathology
Using Barrett et al.’s (2001) average pair-wise correlation 
method, Decker, Turk, Hess, and Murray (2008) reported that 
those with generalized anxiety disorder were not significantly 
different on either negative or positive emotion differentiation 
indices than controls based on daily emotion ratings. Using the 
same method, however, Demiralp et al. (2012) found that indi-
viduals with MDD showed lower negative emotion differentiation 
than controls, but did not differ in terms of positive emotion 
differentiation. Similarly, Kimhy et al. (2014) reported that 
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individuals with schizophrenia obtained significantly lower 
scores on an overall emotion differentiation index (negative and 
positive) but did not differ from healthy controls for negative 
emotional differentiation.
Zaki et al. (2013) found that those with BPD exhibited less 
negative emotional differentiation than controls, and addition-
ally, BPD individuals high in rumination and high in negative 
emotional differentiation were less likely to report nonsuicidal 
self-injury (NSSI) acts or urges, while those lower in negative 
emotional differentiation were more likely to report NSSI 
urges and acts. Similarly, Wolff, Stiglmayr, Bretz, Lammers, 
and Auckenthaler (2007) found that BPD individuals dis-
played less emotional differentiation than healthy controls, 
and the degree of differentiation was positively associated 
with feelings of aversive tension in BPD individuals but not in 
control individuals.
Kashdan et al. (2010) studied the relation between negative 
emotional differentiation and alcohol use in underage social 
drinkers. Emotion differentiation scores for each individual 
were calculated using an average intraclass correlation coeffi-
cient (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979; Tugade et al., 2004). Results indi-
cated negative emotion differentiation moderated the relation 
between predrinking NA level and alcohol consumption; those 
with poorer negative emotional differentiation scores were more 
likely to binge drink in the face of strong predrink NA. Using 
the same method Pond et al. (2012) found that, across three 
studies, individuals with higher levels of emotional differentia-
tion had fewer aggressive tendencies when they reported being 
angry. Finally, Tomko et al. (in press), using occasion-level 
ICCs of emotional differentiation, found that greater momen-
tary differentiation and greater average daily differentiation pre-
dicted lower momentary reports of impulsivity, but a more 
global 28-day measure of negative differentiation did not. It is 
worthwhile to note that almost all of the reviewed studies adjust 
for intensity of experienced affect in estimating the association 
between emotional differentiation and various outcomes, mak-
ing it unlikely that observed differences between clinical and 
healthy individuals is driven solely by clinical individuals’ more 
extreme affective experiences.
Recommendations
The method used to operationalize emotional differentiation 
depends crucially on the research question. When differentia-
tion as a stable individual difference is of interest (e.g., group 
differences in personality/traits) measures designed specifically 
for that purpose are available (Kang & Shaver, 2004). The 
between-person differentiation estimates generated from diary 
and EMA data, like those reviewed before, may also serve as 
useful proxies for such investigations, but we note that there are 
substantial precision and bias limitations when using these 
methods (Lane & Trull, in press). Average interitem correlations 
are less desirable than between-person ICCs, as the prior is a 
special case of the latter in which the assumptions rarely hold. 
In both cases differentiation estimates confound systematic var-
iability across different affective items with other systematic 
variability from other sources, such as time of day, day of week, 
and other emotion-evoking events that are not part of the theo-
retical composition of emotional differentiation. These methods 
do not treat the time-intensive data in a way that appreciates the 
temporal dependencies that are a part of it. As such, when time-
intensive data are collected we recommend the recent methods 
developed by Lane, Trull, and colleagues  (Lane & Trull, in 
press; Tomko et al., in press) for investigating both between-
person, static differences, and within-person, dynamic changes.
General Discussion
This review of affective dynamics and psychopathology reveals 
consistent relations between affective instability and a wide range 
of disorders, between emotion inertia and poorer functioning 
(primarily increased vulnerability to depression), and between 
negative emotional (un)differentiation and disorders and features 
of emotional dysregulation and distress. Unfortunately, efforts to 
develop new classifications of psychopathology based on dimen-
sions of observable behavior and neurobiological measures (e.g., 
the NIH initiative RDoC; Cuthbert & Insel, 2013), often ignore 
the fact that human emotions and behavior are dynamic processes 
that unfold over time in everyday life, and therefore may miss a 
fundamental aspect of psychopathology.
Several implications from this review are evident. First, 
the best method for exploring affective dynamics is a time-
intensive assessment, either in the laboratory or in the real 
world. Furthermore, the data collected using these methods 
must be analyzed using techniques that reflect the time-sensi-
tive ebb and flow of affect. As we discussed, variance indices 
must be supplemented with measures of temporal dependence 
(e.g., inertia) in order to provide a complete and accurate picture 
of how affect unfolds in daily life. Second, affective dynamics 
should be assessed within each individual (i.e., intraindividual) 
and can be viewed in varying time frames (i.e., momentary, 
daily, weekly). At a more molecular level, one can examine the 
momentary differentiation of affective experience. Instability, 
inertia, and emotional differentiation can be indexed at daily 
and weekly levels as well. However, unless one is testing 
specific hypotheses regarding the periodicity of these indices, 
we recommend not extending beyond a daily level when exam-
ining associations with psychopathology. A larger time frame is 
less likely to capture the ebb and flow of affect and to reveal the 
association with psychopathology and its features. Third, as 
one is focusing on affective dynamics, it is important to recog-
nize that these also play an important but not exclusive role in 
the process of emotion (dys)regulation (Carpenter & Trull, 
2013). The experience of affect is also interpreted in certain, 
sometimes idiosyncratic ways, and the way in which one 
responds to this experience will also be influenced by one’s 
ability to use adaptive coping strategies in the face of strong 
emotional experience.
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